Attempt: Some observations about Marxism as it currently seems to exist

Part of the removal of doubt in my life is also clarifying why those doubts emerge in theories in which I am seen as a subscriber.  In the last year, I have been some amazed at the word games used to avoid the hard work of actually clarifying their research project, which I see as mostly consisting of terminology that has degenerated as history has not played out the way that was predicted and the even harder work of working to build the movements and organizational party that dealt with political realities that weren’t spelled out a hundred years ago seems harder and harder to do:

Let me point out a few things:

  • The number of word games that Marxists I know use to hide that most fundamental prediction of theory (the politicization of proletariat as the revolutionary subject of history) has not yet happened is pretty good ammo for most of their enemies. The left-communist critique is often infantile, but they are not wrong that “actually existing socialism” came about mostly through class collaborations in areas where the proletariat was not the majority of the population or the communist movement.
  • Every single Trotskyist stage theory of revolution has an idealist typology behind it, and every single explanation the different groups had for the “revolutionary spirit” returning to the Soviet Union, regardless of their theories about how the Soviet Union did not live up to being a truely revolutionary proletariat state–be it Cliff’s state capitalism, Grant’s version of the “deformed worker’s state,” or the theories of Bonapartism–were, frankly, disproven by the way 1991 went down since none of them predicted the kind of disillusion the Soviet Union actually had. The fact that these groups still exist is an indication of a morbidity of thought.
  • Theories of labor aristocracy as an explanation for this generally ignore that peek of Maoist victories were also in places where the proletariat was not the dominant class in those places either, and while labor aristocracies clearly exist, the idea that somehow the national bourgeoisie has conspired to over-pay a nation’s worth of workers is a conspiracy theory that has less of a chance of being consciously considered than even some of the more grand conspiracy theories of the past. So they aren’t answers to the “why hasn’t proletariat actually done why it was classically predicted to do” either.

Furthermore, we have to deal with the class nature of the people making these claims:

  • While there is actual “working class” membership in Marxist organizations, most of them are not in the main full of people out of their 20s and in the “working class” full time.  The largest groups consist mainly of students or in organizations like the DSA which do not have costs to entry and frankly do not require large commitments of time.   This is explicitly not true for most Marxists “parties.”
  • The organizations I have known that are not highly historically like the IWW which have large working-class membership are not Marxist. The most successful organizations either provide lots of mutual aid services and are slow but steady growth (but still require LARGE commitments of time), or have low cost and low commitment like the D.S.A., but are basically little more than local orgs with a national lobbying branch.  Most of the other orgs with high proletariat membership don’t last, the membership does not have the skills or the time to maintain such an organization.
  • The other successful organizations that are large consist mostly of students, often have funds from University student organizations, or run or collaborate with academic presses.  The produce scholarly or semi-scholarly work.  They also help to provide a niche section of semi-academic political writers exposure in party organs or editorial panels for socialist magazines. The student mass of the organization has lots more leisure time than the average worker to invest in the organization.
  • That so many of who talk this about the proletariat are graduate students even when they are attacking academics has NEVER been lost on me.

 

This does not say the hypothesis of the politicization of the proletariat is wrong.  Indeed, when Marx and Engels were writing, the proletariat, even though it was a smaller proportion of the population than now, was more politicized.  It led to Engels and Kautsky both predicting significant socialist wins in the democratic polities because the size and politicization of the working class were growing and they felt certain the socialists would have the vote.  Answering what happened in an honest manner that deals with the Soviet Union, with some of the Maoist legitimate points about labor aristocracy, with the real conflicts of interest within the working class itself, becomes necessary.

I also don’t have good answers for these questions nor do think even if we did, we would have all answers to all political questions.  The questions of national tensions are not solved solely by economic questions nor is the tension between a universal political project and particularist identities which class solitary ameliorates but does not completely end.

We cannot construct new nebulous categories to get out this, such notions that are hidden in neologism like ‘precariat,’ ‘salaried bourgeoisie,’ and ‘the multitude’ or even classics like ‘the popular front’ and the “mass line’ do not get really get around the failure.  Nor do ideas that somehow “class consciousness” or “false consciousness” explains conflicts in short interests between working-class groups pass muster.

We have to be honest with ourselves most of all.

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Attempt at a Confession

“The body plays a major role in the life of a philosopher. Everything that can be said on the subject can be found in the preface to The Gay Science. Nietzsche knew from where he spoke–he knew nothing but migraines, opthalmy, nausea, vomiting, and a collection of other maladies. He proclaimed that all philosophy is reducible to the embrace of the body, to autobiography of a Being that suffers. Thought emerges out of a subjective flesh that says ‘I’ and ‘the world contains me.’ Thought does not come down from above like the Holy Spirit that causes the elect to speak in tongues. Rather, it rises through the body, welling up from the flesh and entrails.  What philosophizes within a body is nothing other than strength and weakness, ability and disability.” – Michel Onfray,  A Hedonist Manifesto, translated by Joseph McCellan

Today I came to a realization that I have had many times, but its flavor changed on my tongue from sweet to slightly bitter: Doubt has characterized most of my life. I no longer see this as a positive trait.  It is not that being critical has not served me well, but critical towards what exactly?  What has motivated my reasoning?  A friend pointed out to me in response, “I never see skepticism that isn’t subtly directed by sentiment…” echoing Hume. Reasoning is motivated, and mine is no exception.  A Christian friend said, “Doubt is an invitation to an answer. It’s not an answer.”

In many secular theologies, I have invested a lot of my time. The irony of starting with myself, with my body, my thought leads me to something that is unsettling: I can doubt anything, even the consistency of my own being and mind, but I cannot doubt the experience of my body as an experience. Logic may be a check against incoherence coming from the piecemeal development of experience. It, however, as many psychologists repeatedly tell us is not an answer against our own biases–indeed, if we are honest, we can hide our biases in our axioms and the logic still flows.  So starting with myself I must admit that how much secular world rhymes when with I encountered in church, but how traveling the world taught me that this isn’t nearly as universal as someone like Michael Shermer would assert.

Starting with that fundamental point, my own body and experience, I have left with one conclusion. I cannot ignore my own context and my own motivated reasoning.  I returned to Hegel and Marx when I felt like I saw capitalism failing the people I loved, and my first marriage cracked under the economic strain and the stress of my self-misconceptions.  Now, after seven and a half years abroad and listening–not watching–to my current wife fight late-stage melanoma through immune therapy from skype calls in Cairo, it makes sense that my patience with systemization that seems to confirm what I would like to be true would start to run out.

This is not to say I have totally given up on these “grand narratives” of history.  Even starting with my self and my own body, I see that history is hard to predict and yet rhymes with itself immensely.  As I said in another context, the minutiae of history are largely stochastic, it is only more predictable in aggregate.  Yet it is the individual minutiae that build the aggregate like every lived minute makes up a life.  This disconnect is in the tension between self and other, and how that relationship defines both.

Ironically, removing a lot of doubt in my life also means removing a lot of false certainties.   I cannot make an assertion truth just by uttering it.  People perhaps have noticed this in my podcasts, in my increased hedging of grand theories, and the inclusion of “maybes” or a thousand little caveats.

I am veering towards the abstract again. This seems natural.  To formalize is to make the comparison more plausible. It is why quantitative analysis seems more sturdy than qualitative, and mathematics a better way to build an aggregate model than phenomenology.  Yet, if I am honest, I no longer think you can build things just with critique, and no longer see some form of Ur-rationality as enough to base any observation on.

The last three years, I have nearly died myself of complications of typhoid, moved back to my home country, lost nearly 100 pounds, and lived in fear of losing my spouse from something that was no one’s fault and to which there was no real answer.  To reduce my doubts, I have to admit that there is a difference between what I will and what I know.  To make what I will into being required work–both my own and others who will to want the same.

I suppose this is why I never had the hostility to Nietzsche as many others.  Yes, Nietzsche is unsystematic and resists hard consistency, but why should we expect a suffering philologist to be so?  Many of the systems we build are descriptive, limitedly, and we wish to make them prescriptive as if thinking would make categories ontological real just because they appear coherent.

Walking in the cold winter afternoon today with my wife to the car, seeing her smile but walk slowly from the effects of the last two years, I am struck by how much I don’t know.  At how much the rearview picture seems consistent and obvious, but the constant doubting is, in a way, a way to avoid looking at the limitations of my knowledge.

 

Some Thoughts to be Thought Through After Las Vegas

One of the stranger impulses that one has a problem dealing with in the age of social media is not just a tendency to feel to comment on every element of an event with a preconceived set of basically tribal political criteria when something like this happens. This is understandable, the US has many problems and we think our side has a quick answer to it. I find myself responding to a lot of liberal arguments, not because they are more egregious or illogical, but because I am exposed to more of them as a left-wing urban dweller.

On the idea of terrorism, things get complicated. I actually find the idea that lone wolf shooters are white and the media doesn’t call white terrorists, terrorists suspect. The media narrative around Timothy McVeigh or various IRA bombings in the 1990s, they were clearly defined as terrorists. Mass shooters weren’t though, and at the time, there was no legal reason to do so. This is not to say dispropriate hysteria is not applied to non-white “terror” attacks and mass shootings are treated as terror in those cases by the media often. Prior to the 2000s, if you don’t know the motive for a killing, you don’t know if it is terrorism. The first mass shooters weren’t terrorists because they have no objective beyond the act itself. If any act of violence is terrorism because it is violent, then the category has no real meaning.

Now, by federal statute, terrorism is defined by motive and only domestic attacks carried out at the behest of or on the behalf of foreign organizations. There is no federal charge for domestic terrorism, but there are state-level charges. Nevada defines terrorism solely be scale and targets, and mass shootings count. The media figures don’t know that I am guessing because there are 50 sets of laws that apply here.

There are all sorts of biases at play but seems like expanding the category of terrorism to encompass all sorts of random or semi-random violence just increases the arbitrariness of state charges. The expansion of state-level terrorism laws was a product of the Bush-Obama period, but there is no standard legal definition, and encouraging an expanded popular definition seems to be operating on the idea that if everyone is oppressed together, then the privilege will go away.

Then comes gun control arguments, and I feel like I always to add a bunch of caveats: I am not anti-gun control and I am not a second amendment fetishist. However, I am a little tired of the ” if it was only as hard to get a gun as it is a car” In most states, this simply isn’t true. There are states in the West and the South where it is very easy to get a gun, but you don’t have to pass a safety check, get a background check, in some states a mental health check, and go through a waiting period to a driver’s license in most states. You have to be of age and pass a test, and maybe go through a probationary phase with use restrictions. As study after study shows, there is no strong relationship between state- and city-level gun control laws and gun crime. 

IF you want to be honest, admit that the philosophy federalism over most regulation is a problem, but then admit that your issue is larger than the second amendment. There is no way to ad hoc this problem as many liberals say, but there is also little evidence even from international statistics that gun control alone will decrease the violence.

And as I have said many times, poverty reduction correlates more strong to decreased homicides than gun control if you look at international statistics. There is evidence that national level laws would have an effect on the margins, but very little if they would have an effect given state by state laws.

One would do well stop only mentioning rich countries with low historical rates of homicide before their gun control laws as your sole model. IF the laws are the same Mexico and UK but the gun-violence isn’t then you cannot attribute the success to the legal regime. You would have to control for a other effects, including access created by the US border. In short, the study is beyond what I have seen either liberal or conservative outlets actually doing. Furthermore, looking at the current evidence and the likelihood of the kinds of gun deaths, gun regulation would likely have an effect on suicides more than any other category of crime. While Australia’s example is often sited, the European trends of the last half-decade indicate that mass shootings as a method of political attack will likely happen despite strict gun regulation, but its hard to say, because while mass terror attacks are increasing, they are still incredibly statistically rare and our sample sizes are small. Many conservatives pointed that out in the Australia case, despite the reporting at Slate and Salon, that as, non-that-conservative L.A. Times points outs:

Each year between 1979 and 1996, Australia had an average of 3.6 gun deaths (both homicides and suicides) per 100,000 people. After the NFA was passed, that rate dropped to an average of 1.2 gun deaths per 100,000 people.

In both time periods, the total number of firearm-related deaths was on the decline. But “the trend accelerated” after gun control took effect, the researchers wrote.

The researchers also found that passage of the NFA was associated with a steep drop in the overall homicide rate. Before Port Arthur, homicides involving weapons of any kind had been falling at a rate of 0.3% per year, on average. Afterward, they fell by 3.1% per year. There was no evidence that killers who couldn’t get their hands on guns switched to other weapons instead, the team wrote. . .

Overall, gun-related deaths fell faster after gun control than before it. But some of those gains might be due to factors that have nothing to do with guns. For instance, trauma doctors and surgeons have gotten better at treating gunshot victims. They’re also getting treated more rapidly in the NFA era, thanks in part to the growing ubiquity of cellphones, the researchers wrote.

In short, the most steady analysis of Australia doesn’t produce clean data for either side and inclusion of statistics like that of Mexico, where similar laws are failed, we realize that even if the laws were passed, the laws themselves would not necessarily remotely effective policy.

This is not to say we don’t need a dialogue about gun control, we do. But perhaps we can quit pretending that this is just about federal regulation, or the second amendment. Perhaps it isn’t just a question of political will, which my liberals friends seem to think they can shame people into supporting, but a question of complex, multicausal social issues and a constitutional framework that is ill-equipped be coherent.

a reading list that is entirely idiosyncratic on political theology, political anthropology, political philosophy, and political economy as well as philosophy of science and the history of philosophy, part 1

One will note that these not only don’t agree but often in conflict in claims directly. However, this combination of books has been helpful to clarify my thinking. These are in no order and not categorized.

Political and Philosophical Manuscripts by K. Marx
“The Critique of the Gotha Program” by K. Marx
Das Kapital by K. Marx
Negative Dialectics by T. Adorno
Introduction to Dialectics by T. Adorno
The Dialectic of Enlightenment by. M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno
After Virtue by A. MacIntyre
What Kinship Is-And Is Not by M. Sahlins
The Human Condition by H. Arendt
On Tyranny by L. Strauss
On The Notion of Authority by A. Kojeve
On Politics by A. Ryan
How (Not) to Be Secular by J. K.A. Smith
The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy by G. Lloyd.
Violence: Six Sideways Reflections by S. Zizek
A Secular Age by C. Taylor
Purity and Danger by M. Douglas
Stone Age Economics by M. Sahlins
Orientalism by E. Said
God Is Dead: Secularization in the West by Steve Bruce
Property and Progress: the historical origins and social foundations of self-sustaining growth BY R. Brenner
Understanding Class by E.O. Wright
The Mismeasure of Man by S. Gould
Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History by S. Gould
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life by D. Dennett
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: by I. Lakatos
Occidentalism: Images of the West by J. G. Carrier
The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View by E. M. Woods
The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual by H. Cruse
The Invention of Culture by R. Wagner
The Making of the English Working Class By E.P Thompson
Outline of Theory of Practice By P. Bourdieu
Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson
Europe and the People Without History by Eric R. Wolf
The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution by G. Cochran and H. Harpendiing
Paleofantasy: What Evolution Really Tells Us about Sex, Diet, and How We Live By M. Zuk
The Morality of Happiness by J. Annas
The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics ed. By M. Schofield and G. Striker
Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation by J. Banaji
Man and Society by J. Plamenatz
The Idea of the Muslim World by C. Aydin
Marx’s Theory of Price and its Modern Rivals by H. Nicholas
Capitalism. Competition, Conflict, Crises by A. Shaikh
For and Against Method: Including Lakatos’s Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence editted by M. Motterlini
An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital by M. Heinrich translated A. Locascio
The Making of Marx’s Capital-Vol 1 by R. Rosdolsky
Historical Capitalism by I. Wallerstein
Reclaiming Marx’s ‘Capital’: A Refutation of the Myth of Inconsistency by A. Kliman
Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought by S.S. Wolin
The End of Theory: Financial Crises, the Failure of Economics, and the Sweep of Human Interaction by R. Bookstaber
The Long Depression: Marxism and the Global Crisis of Capitalism by M. Roberts
After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840–1900 by F. C. Beiser
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy by K. Marx
The German Historicist Tradition by F. C. Beiser
Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy by Paul A. Rahe
German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801 by F. C. Beiser
The Black Jacobins by C.L.R James
Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition by C. J. Robinson
The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisi by Y. Wu
Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class by J. Andreas
On Revolution by H. Arendt
Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology by K. Sterelny and P. E. Griffiths

Some Axioms on Long March Through the Academy

  •  It is an empirical fact that left theory after 1968 largely left the factories as an organizing model and even the community organizing model and then went into Academia. Even if the overall left-wing skew of academia is overstated, which it is, one can look at where the prominent surviving members of Weather Underground and BPP work now to see this.
  • It is also an empirical fact that post-war boom in academia, in both skills training and scientific investment against the cold war, made these institutions flush with money. Since they were seen as largely traditional institutions, rent-seeking trends among administration was not predominant at first as they are now, and these institutions could count on state largess and tolerance of highly dissenting opinions in fields that were cheap to maintain (i.e., fields and posts didn’t require must research cost outside of the investment in professors’ salaries, which were marginal compared to research labs expenses, but also didn’t bring in a lot of outside investment).
  • It is also an empirical fact that in the 1990s, the pressure to increase college enrollments and make campuses more competitive increased rent-seeking among non-faculty portions of the university. One sees this in the explosion of administration and building projects in US and UK universities for this point.
  • This has meant, however, there is more pressure to cut those fields that are not professional-training grounds and not fund empirical research in fields.
  • One of the things that I don’t hear leftists talk about that much is that one of the reasons left theory is so popular in academia–beyond the fact that it is a good place for cranks to hide and get a measure of legitimacy– it doesn’t cost much to produce theory. It’s easy to a get TA or post-doc to think. Fieldwork and empirical data require capital. The reason there is more theory divorced from empirical reality in left-wing circles is not just bad faith academics, but also that there is little funding incentive for empirical research in these fields outside of education, medicine,  and other functions that are DIRECTLY tied to the state.
  • If you are a Ph.D. in some form of left theory that is driven primarily by the humanities or media studies, please forgive me for treating you with suspicion. I think getting credentials in phrenology was also suspect. The incentives aren’t there in contemporary academia for you do high-grade empirical research and the research program has largely degenerated in Lakato’s sense of the research program thas no longer has theoretical or empirical consensus.
  • Capitalists often do much better work on organizational intelligence than even pure academics do because it matters to them for survival. In areas like this, the left would do well to ACTUALLY READ the unsexy literature even if pair it with and inform their theory. So often much managerial work on organizing is miles ahead of left academic political work on the same.
  • This is not to say those studies are not mired in ideology or even self-consistent; however, if one is a critical reader one can find better empirical data from such work that is used in most left theory as well as better use of the raw data from psychological studies.
  • What capitalists (business analysts) don’t do well is historical analysis because there is not a good immediate profit incentive in understanding long-term trends and origins. There is no time preference incentive to do so.
  • This means that for the left theorists to work on NOT maintaining an institutional disadvantage for its organizing, they must rethink their relationship to academia and be far more willing to use empirical data from industry fields and pair that with its historical and economic analysis more skillfully. PhDs in academia, particularly in the humanities or softer social sciences, have little incentive to do this because of the current systemic limitations in funding as well as the way papers must be produced fairly quickly to maintain one’s career, and one can’t blame them for it.
  • It is time to end the long march through the Academy.

 

A few thoughts On Parkinson’s review of Kill All Normies

I will start by admitting that I have a relationship to Kill Normies and have been involved with groups with tangential relationships to the Communist League of Tampa. I also generally respect both the author of the review I am discussing and Angela Nagle.

There is much to comment on in Donald Parkinson’s response. He has some fair criticism and some that I agree with. For example, when he comments that Nagle’s book seemed unfair to tumblr identity politics and over-blamed it for the growth of the alt-right, I am tempted to agree in part. For example, Parkinson is completely correct that “Politics happens in the real world, not on the internet. Nothing is said about the efforts of white supremacist organizers like Identity Europa or the Traditionalist Workers Party to organize frats or rural workers and what kind of visions these groups have (a balkanization of the US and the creation of an all-white “enthno state” is a common one). Rather Nagle pretends the alt-right is only an online phenomena, when these people have been trying to promote these politics for years.”  Indeed, when I personally voted to publish the book, I said the same thing.  However, Parkinson asserts that this is “liberal and not proper Marxist materialism” but then goes on to make genealogical arguments about the history of ideas and not ‘a proper materialist’ analysis himself. IN fact, some of his arguments, seem to this reader as perhaps more problematic than what he is accusing Nagle.

I find some of Parkinson’s responses undeveloped: “While some alt-righters might try to move towards a sort of third positionist attempt to combine anti-capitalism with their idea of counter-revolution, ultimately their ideas amount to economic nationalism and localism and don’t actually challenge the rule of private property.” How does one adjudicate the “ultimately” of such ideas without directly referencing any of them? Dugin, the “fourth positionist” and Eurasianist, is extremely distrustful of capitalism and in some ways would love to see the abolition of markets and solidifying of relations that frankly quasi-feudal.  Whereas Moldbug and Nick Land, picking up from Hans Herman Hobbe, would argue that consistent capitalism would lead to something akin to feudalism, which they see as the privatization of government.  The political impulse of leftists is tended to grand them that–except that doing see gives up fundamental socialists premises about the difference between exploitation and oppression.   In granting that these differences don’t matter, we undo several of our own economic arguments.  In short, Parkinson argues that a movement is less internally diverse than it is, and sometimes in ways that actually hurt Marxist thinking.  The thinking is muddled both by the alt-right and in response it to it.

One can see this tendency to assert things are monolithic when they are in when Parkinson says, “the roots of the alt-right are not in the historical tradition of transgression. Rather they are part of the tradition of counter-enlightenment, the ideologies of those who wished to forever undo 1789 and 1917. De Maistre and Carlyle, Nietzsche, Julius Evola, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Mussolini, and Martin Heidegger are the intellectual heritage of the alt-right.”

Would require a discussion that each and everyone one of those authors not having any “tradition of transgression”  as he seems to assert that counter-enlightenment is a defense of a status quo?  Nietzsche’s relationship to the counter-enlightenment is more difficult than this rhetorical pseudo-argument by list allow, and frankly so is Mussolini’s. Parkinson is a serious student of history and knows this, but feels that linking of genealogies is enough to as proof.  While this is beyond the scope of a polemic and the tension between transgression and ancien regimes is well covered by several books even the liberal historian Isaiah Berlin. Furthermore, the alt-right’s history is larger than this.  Richard Spencer is as likely to use modern biology and Adorno to make his points as Nietzsche; Paul Gottfried, who coined the term, was a student of Marcuse and his points against liberalism are against its managerial impulses.  This does not prove that Nagle is right or wrong, and even when I vote for the book to published, I critiqued it mildly for not discussing its intellectual history; however, the phenomenon people like “Sargon of Akkad” have little to do with people like whom Spencer branded alt-light, and Sargon’s influence far outreaches Spencers.  The “Alt-light” of 4chan seem to come from the perspective of Sam Harris and Greg Cochran and find Schmitt, De Maistre, Evola,  and DeMiastre too religious.   Nick Land and Moldbug may love Carlyle and Nietzsche, but they also argue naturalization of reactionary thinking and see the religious impulse defended by people like Carlyle as somewhat weak-minded.

Parkinson then goes on:  “The idea alt-right are being transgressive against the rulers of culture is only true in the most shallow sense. Their inherently anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic ideology is actually fully compatible with capitalism.”

Really?  Some of them alt-right think it is (Milo and Sargon), and some do not.  Whatever the case, this could easily and IS easily reversed by alt-rightists against communists.  The assertion of the rhetorical device of “actually” doesn’t make that argument, and this is clearer when one sees Parkinson’s support for it.

Parkinson asserts: “Ultimately, norms like nationalism and the family are upheld by the alt-right, norms which are essential for the reproduction of capitalism. ”

To this, one must say simply, prove it. First, it contradicts Marxist assertions that all that is solid melts into air” and the softening of national boundaries imply by global trade law?  Yes, in the past, national capitalists were a more viable project, but not in an age of limited national resources and scarcely able to grow profits in internal markets.  Nationalisms failures are beyond that the “necessary for the reproduction of capitalism”:  ethnonationalism threatens trade by destabilizing tax regimes and often threatenings transnational property claims, limits efficiency by limited the movement of populations and skilled labor, and can even act as a limit of accumulation of raw materials.   This is not to say that nationalism and regimes of nations are not a benefit to particular sectors of capital: they clearly are and enable monopoly regimes and intellectual property and other state-created pseudo-commodities.  However, these are tangential to capitalism, not necessary to it.  The bourgeois can work effectively and efficiently in trans-national polities and multi-ethnic empires, as seen in the “New World” itself.

The family is crucial for the reproduction of people being regulated by capital, but the family is also atomized by the market commodification and alienation of relationships.  Again, family bonds are threatened by needs of capital requiring skilled labor movement–it literally breaks up relationships. The oppression of women–generally from the lack of compensation of their domestic labor–remains in capital even, or especially, in the cases where “the family “is in decline so as in the case of working class, poor mothers who disproportionately are unmarried and whose labor costs them the ability to earn in the market. While conservatives and alt-rightists would assert that this is not sexism but a result of the market, many former libertarians who used to champion this not see this as dangering sexual relations.   The alt-right says this alienation is bad (which it is) but its answer is to return an ideal that unrealistic given the contraints of labor.  While gender abolition also threatens this dynamic as does expanded notions of sexual identity, the family’s tensions are pre-capitalists and capital has melted it down for good and ill.  To merely assert the contrary is both lazy and doesn’t follow the empirical facts.    Capitalism needs “the family” only selectively, and the romanticization of the past is only convincing because of this.  However, it is much more honest to point out that not only is a return to prior norm, romanticized, but that it would be economically unviable to the very people to whom it would have the most appeal.

Indeed, while much has been made about the dangers of economism, and much hey has been made about the dangers of the determinism, the problems of alt-right show the limitations of both as assumed modes of analysis.   The success of the alt-right and the left’s lack of the ability to address, which Nagle, however, “liberal” one finds it as being, must be addressed in terms of the multifactored analysis, not just in the defense of a nebulous left and their “lived experience.”    One can, as Parkinson does, understand that popularity of the tumblr left comes out of the atomization is a result of the same processes as the alt-right on a different kind of person.  However, one cannot pretend that alt-right is just the assertion of the status quo defending itself or, worse, as Parkinson implies the result of frustrated libertarian thinking about the status quoe.  Yes, I agree with Parkinson, we all know libertarians who became alt-rightists, but we also all know plenty of those who came from other kinds of thinking.  Furthermore, while I am sure both Nagle and Parkinson know, there have been plenty of liberal and Marxist leftists who moved to the alt-right too.  The reasons why cannot be reduced purely to ideology.

Parkinson does the get a strain of thought in libertarianism right: “There is a sort of vulgar positivism to libertarian ideology that bides well with race realism. Libertarianism ideology, at its most extreme in anarcho-capitalism, has even flirted with endorsement for monarchism over democracy such as in the works of Hans-Herman Hoppe. Seeing markets as more democratic than any kind of state institution, free market liberalism is itself is critical of all that is egalitarian and democratic and therefore in its most extreme variants biding well with the ideology of the alt-right” but ignores that this happened on the left with both National Bolshevism (a la Francis Yockey) and with Lyndon LaRouche.

This is far too volunteerist a reading, and in critiquing Nagle for lack of materialism ends up being not particularly materialist itself.  IF the hierarchies of racialized capital are weakening, it is capitalism, itself, not leftism or Marxism, which until 2007 has been in global decline, that has weakened it.   Furthermore,  his conclusion,”Yet opposition to identity politics from the left has led many self-proclaimed communists to embrace the book, despite the inherently conservative nature of Nagle’s arguments. While it is true that identity politics can be used as a way to suppress class politics, Nagle doesn’t even seem to think that class politics should replace identity politics.” Nagle actually explicitly says the contrary but doesn’t have the same idea of class politics as Parkinson.  Instead of debating the meaning of that, Parkinson does  what I see as an idealist move, one that has infected Marxism since Lenin’s argument that “monism” was materialist (although how there can be a substance other than the material in materialism remains beyond me), of a label substituting for an argument, but in doing so, he has made not made the materialist counter-argument well enough.

I agree with him that in some ways “Her primary problem with identity politics seems to its “oversensitivity” and “extremism”, not their failure to adequately address exploitation and oppression in a materialist manner” although Nagle thinks that oversensitivity is a result of a lack of class politics being popularly available.  A  fact that Parkinson’s own critique is dependent on; for without that fact, tumblr politics isn’t defensible.  So while I agree that Nagle may be not as radical as presented, I think it is useful in that it attempts, even flawly, to explain “why now”.  Her answer is volunteerist, but so is Parkinson’s here, who points out the long history of the movement, but ignores their lack of viability until recently.  In short, while I agree with Parkinson that Nagle doesn’t deal with the long history of alt-right and limits it to the online politics, and I agree with the Parkinson that Nagle ultimately is not materialist enough, but on many points he answers Nagle’s volunteerism with volunteerism, and leaves this in the realm of a question answered by will, which in the end doesn’t explain much at all.

I invite Donald Parkinson to respond to these points if I am being fair and clarify his critique. I suspect interesting thinking may come out such a dialogue, or, at least, if my readings of Parkinson’s position need further clarification.

 

 

 

Much Ado About Chattering Mill: Free Speech and Its Justification

There has been a proverbial shit-storm about free speech lately, and many who identify as “left” or liberal or a combination of the two–whatever that means– have been battling out the lines of “Free Speech” around terms largely set by the right and their responses have largely been limited by those terms. However, recently, there have been attempts to undo this limitation in framing. Take,  for example, The “Free Speech” Charade, by Aaron R. Hanlon, over at the New Republic:

Aaron Hanlon’s argument seeming makes sense as the move to the lofty rhetoric of freedom of speech hits many attempts by the right-wing to censor speech itself, and that many of the protests are grounded in legitimate grievance.  This is true and far, but it doesn’t really work as it defines the “reasonable” free speech defense in defending content before it is stated off of an assumed past.

Hanlon’s concerns appear to reject the right’s framing; however, the anyone who is defending the absolute act, including most leftists of the past, would say, Hanlon has conflated two issues.  Hanlon’s other responses about censoring accessing being based on law around institutions also conflates the argument of law and with the argument of rights, although this is fair since almost all arguments about rights are rooted in law as natural law justifications of rights (which the Bill of Rights itself was justified in) seem no longer sustainable in a post-Deistic world.

Furthermore, ironically, if one digs into Hanlon’s academic background, he knows this. He, after all, studies media analysis and Enlightenment values.  Hanlon’s defense of context is not some kind of Marxist imposition of an ideological code.   His argument mirrors a caveat in one of the founding texts of Liberalism, Mill’s On Liberty, and I suspect he knows this.   Also, other articles criticizing the methodology of the PC Left, by Hanlon himself seems to come from a utilitarian and Enlightenment calculus.  Take for example his 2016 article, “What the P.C. Left Is Doing Wrong in Language Debates”,

That is, I take the castigation of someone for what they genuinely don’t know or can’t reasonably be expected to know as a justice issue unto itself, a problem related to what the philosopher Miranda Fricker calls the “epistemic injustice” of allowing prejudice to shape one’s impression of another’s credibility as a knower. Epistemic injustice may work in the other direction, too, in the bad-faith supposition that someone ought to know something is offensive when broader society has failed to treat it as such (therefore that person deserves to be shamed, scorned, or ridiculed for not knowing).

There’s a time for activism and a time for education. If the social justice movement is going to be successful, it needs to do a better job of identifying teaching opportunities amid perhaps more obvious occasions for activism, and thus to discern the difference between those who utter clichés of questionable meaning and those who should be confronted for their bigotry. This is particularly the case for those of us who hold positions of educational or socioeconomic privilege, who are at least partially insulated from certain kinds of bigotry.

If we want our communities to be more just, open, and inclusive, we need to make adjustments. This means accepting the reality that a lot of people, even intelligent and thoughtful people, really don’t understand the implications of quite a lot of everyday language not typically associated with bigotry. It makes little pedagogical sense to lecture these people, to tell them bluntly what they can and can’t say. We need to approach such scenarios not simply with the willingness to question, but also to listen to and countervail the kinds of answers we don’t like to hear. As with any teaching and learning scenario, we need to understand our audience before we can facilitate its understanding.

Interestingly, the epistemic privilege argument he is making here sounds like an argument about fallability of position updated to our times.  Now, it is not the same thing exactly, but it is related and sounds something like part of Mill’s argument for free speech.

Indeed, the problem becomes the conflict of harm reduction and relative affluence compared with an absolute value.  Hanlon says argues that the no platforming may be a right that institutions have, but in line with the center thought of Enlightenment liberalism (and current trends of the left-edge of the center of the Democratic party):

For this process to work productively, changes need to happen on both sides of the no-platforming issue. Students and protesters need to eschew violence and disruption to focus instead on the many viable arguments for why low-value speakers like Coulter don’t deserve a campus platform. Free-speech activists, meanwhile, should rein in overly broad definitions of censorship, and understand that free speech means the right to speak, not the right to a college platform.

The problem still remains that it is possible to prove, for sure, what a person will say before they say it.  So viable arguments against “low-value” speaker, which while I agree with Hanlon is full of assumptions about the value that he himself doesn’t really assert, are impossible to make soundly and validly if our concerns are the content of their speech. They can only be made probabilistically.

Furthermore, there are a ton of practical considerations about access that these free speech debates don’t consider and Hanlon is right about that.  But one must establish a principle before tackling the caveats or limitations and not conflate several related issues that overlap but are not, strictly speaking, the same.

Why is it important that Hanlon, however, is carrying a conflict out of Mill?  Was not Mill the absolutist on freedom of speech on Utilitarian grounds?  How then is Hanlon also a representative of that tradition?

A problem on analytic forms of logic is that they are poor grounds for justifying “right” and that analytic formulations of logic–including deductive and inductive–have trouble justifying rights too as they cannot adjudicate on the soundness of premises in and of themselves. We can assert abductive reasoning, but the abductive case is always limited on matters of rights for reasons I will get into later.

Mill attempted to lay down an objective argument for freedom of speech without Lockean reference to natural law (although he does share some Lockean assumptions that make this problematic). Mill realized that Benthamite utilitarian thinking would have no such space for that kind of right.

Many former and current Leftists have turned to Mill to justify freedom of speech. Most famously the cankerous and often brilliant Norman Finkelstein:

My friend Douglas Lain who has interviewed Finkelstein was convinced by the argument.  However, unless you bracket out most of Mill’s framework and justification, you still can’t reason yourself to a principle to oppose Hanlon and company’s soft caveats.  After all, this is institutional, not legal, censorship; and is not Mill also the prophet of harm-reduction as a principle of ethics and legality?

First, let us put forth an attempt to formalize Mill’s infallibility principle, and then I will get to the rest of the argument and what I see as a limitation of both in answering an intelligent moderate supporter of Campus censorship like Hanlon.

My friend Douglas Lain would  part of Mills argument (and Finkelstein’s and attempts to reduce to a deductive principle):

A) Humans do not have precognitive powers.

B) A claim to know a thing prior to argumentation, debate or cognition is a claim of precognitive power.

Therefore,

C) Human claims to know a thing prior to argumentation are false.

If  Human claims to know things prior to argumentation are false, then an argument must be allowed so that those beliefs can be defeated.

Now, I actually think this is a problematic argument because the premise A) would have to be proven and it seems SO far removed from the debate–a debate about cognition and physics–that it seems hardly worth arguing, but to admit the validity of Lain’s argument would imply that either you have to reject the first premise or accept the latter. Furthermore, the conflation of argument, debate, or cognition, actually equates two forms of discourse with all conscious brain activity, which is questionable.  However, this conflation is to avoid problems of A priori distinctions, both analytic (such as tautologies) and synthetic (things that are contingently necessary for formal logic).

In short, Lain and Finkelstein see the primary strength of Mill as moving the argument away from ethics and harm-reduction, and into the epistemology, thus limiting the applicability of harm reduction arguments.

Mill does actually argue something like this.  In the second chapter of On Liberty, Mill puts forth these principles, summarized on CONFESSIONS OF A SUPPLY-SIDE LIBERAL,

  1. First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. (See ”John Stuart Mill on the Adversary System,“ ”John Stuart Mill on the Protection of ‘Noble Lies’ from Criticism“ and ”Should Troubling Arguments Be Kept Away from Those Who Might Be Unduly Swayed by Them?“)
  2. Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. (See ”A Remedy for the One-Sidedness of the Human Mind“ and ”Why Progressives and Conservatives Need Each Other.“)
  3. Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. (See ”Let the Wrong Come to Me, For They Will Make Me More Right“ and “In Praise of Trolls.”)
  4. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience. (See “How Freedom of Thought for Falsehood Keeps the Truth Alive.”)

One notices quickly that Mill’s argument mirrors my friend’s deductive argument, but isn’t a deductive argument.  Lain brackets out the fourth proposition and doesn’t deal with the third.  In the case of colleges versus strong conservative and reactionary speakers, the consensus of society is generally with neither.

The liberal will respond quickly to Doug though that most of these days, on either side, are not about truth.  Lain would response, rightly, that you can’t know that. But the opponent would then bring up harm-reduction and unequal access as other limiting factors and that censoring some conservatives just on campus does not limit those ideas from spreading, but that the speakers could harm remaining students with their words.

Furthermore, as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  Mill’s conception of free speech had caveats and philosophical basis not shared now.  The first is that Mill accepted harm-reduction as a limit:

In the footnote at the beginning of Chapter II of On Liberty, Mill makes a very bold statement:

If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. (1978, 15)

This is a very strong defense of free speech; Mill tells us that any doctrine should be allowed the light of day no matter how immoral it may seem to everyone else. And Mill does mean everyone:

If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (1978, 16)Such liberty should exist with every subject matter so that we have “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological” (1978, 11). Mill claims that the fullest liberty of expression is required to push our arguments to their logical limits, rather than the limits of social embarrassment. Such liberty of expression is necessary, he suggests, for the dignity of persons. If liberty of expression is stifled, the price paid is “a sort of intellectual pacification” that sacrifices “ the entire moral courage of the human mind” (1978, 31).

These are powerful claims for freedom of speech, but as I noted above, Mill also suggests that we need some rules of conduct to regulate the actions of members of a political community. The limitation he places on free expression is “one very simple principle,” (1978, 9) now usually referred to as the harm principle, which states that

…the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. (1978, 9)

Mill justification for his epistemic argument is not arguing for epistemically but on the grounds of self-sovereignty and self-ownership (a la Locke), and that same principle means that harming another sovereignty would put both in conflict and thus to avoid that conflict, some restrictions apply.  One sees this puts some nebulous limits even on MIll’s strong argument, and that it is justified in ontological and metaphysical premise that may be shared.

The Standford Encylopedia goes on:

With these comments, and many others, Mill demonstrates his distaste of the apathetic, fickle, tedious, frightened and dangerous majority. It is quite a surprise, therefore, to find that he also seems to embrace a fairly encompassing offense principle when the sanction does involve social disapprobation:

Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners and, coming thus within the category of offenses against others, may rightly be prohibited. (1978, 97 author’s emphasis)

Similarly, he states that “The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance” (1978, 53). In the latter parts of On Liberty Mill also suggests that distasteful people can be held in contempt, that we can avoid them(as long as we do not parade it), that we can warn others about them, and that we can persuade, cajole and remonstrate with those we deem offensive. These actions are legitimate as the free expression of anyone who happens to be offended as long as they are done as a spontaneous response to the person’s faults and not as a form of punishment.
But those who exhibit cruelty, malice, envy, insincerity, resentment and crass egoism are open to the greater sanction of disapprobation as a form of punishment, because these faults are wicked and other-regarding. It may be true that these faults have an impact on others, but it is difficult to see how acting according to malice,envy or resentment necessarily violates the rights of others. The only way that Mill can make such claims is to incorporate an offense principle and hence give up on the harm principle as the only legitimate grounds for interference with behavior. Overall, Mill’s arguments about ostracism and disapprobation seem to provide little protection for the individual who may have spoken in a non-harmful manner but who has nevertheless offended the sensibilities of the masses.

Hence we see that one of the great defenders of the harm principle seems to shy away from it at certain crucial points; even Mill was unable to mount a defense of free speech on this “one simple principle” alone. It does, however, remain a crucial part of the liberal defense of individual freedom.

Furthermore, ostracism and disapprobation is what the no platformers are doing, although, with the aid of a state or institutional apparatus in education, they are not passing laws. In short, Mill’s assumptions don’t get you out of this, and don’t answer the reply to Lain’s hypothetical that these debates “aren’t about truth.”

While it is hard to justify a principle on an abductive argument, indeed Eric Posner seems to argue that from abductive logic, human rights are useless category if you judge them consequentially and historically

It seems, like many from Marx to later liberals, argued abductively for the principles of Mill.  Debate is likely to increase knowledge, even if it is knowledge of the actual position of one’s enemies. Relying on institutions or the state can be used by people who control them or fund them against you.  So instead of increasing the access of a stage of the marginalized at the expense of reactionaries, one may simply lose the stage in a way factors the powerful.

Note that this can’t be deductively argued or even argued on absolute utilitarian grounds. It can be argued as likely inferences to outcomes in a system.  The problem with Hanlon’s argument is that it places either consensus or funders in charge of deciding who is of high value.  It is unlikely that they would side with either side at the current. However, I cannot argue this as absolute principle of reason. I can’t root in the seeming rock hardness of ontological status, epistemological certainty, or even historical progression.  I can only argue it pragmatically based on abductive logic applied with historically most likely outcomes in a system.

If we save Mill’s point, we actually cannot protect or determine on the system he used to make that point.